This can best be understood through the concept of “guanxi-warfare” — a phrase we use, derived from the Chinese term for “network or networks of relationships.” This refers to how China tests policies, strategies and tactics at the peripheries of its relationship networks.

Understanding guanxi-warfare – from the perspective of the Communist Party of China – can better focus U.S. diplomatic efforts and force postures. Leveraging China’s approach to how it uses networks of relationships to conduct war can restrain its behavior not only in the Middle East but also in the South China Sea.

Conceptually, the Communist Party expects the United States to attack the party’s ideologically diverse and geographically distant partners, i.e. its far-flung network members. To China, U.S. moves against its aligned affiliates demonstrates both U.S. opposition to Chinese positions and U.S. commitment to principles, interests and counteractions.

Bluntly, the Communist Party expects the United States to degrade or destroy distal nodes of China’s network to narrow Chinese options for action. Not degrading these nodes implicitly approves China’s predacious activities.

Concretely, the Communist Party sees U.S. pressure on Russia, through Ukraine, just as it sees U.S. pressure on Iran, through Israel. Both serve as indicators and warnings of the U.S. measures that China should expect to counter China’s predatory behavior in the South China Sea and towards Taiwan.

The Iran case

A Chinese maxim notes: the mountains are high, and the emperor is far away. Adapting the adage for Iran, the cultural divide with China is high, and the ayatollah is far away. To Beijing, these characteristics make Tehran an obvious guanxi-warfare target that Washington could reasonably expect Beijing to let go. Indeed, China’s rhetorical response to U.S. bombs hitting Iranian nuclear nodes reveals limits on China’s ability or willingness to act.

The PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs website simply says, “China strongly condemns the U.S. attacks on Iran and bombing of nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the IAEA. The actions of the U.S. seriously violate the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law, and have exacerbated tensions in the Middle East. China calls on the parties to the conflict, Israel in particular, to reach a ceasefire as soon as possible, ensure the safety of civilians, and start dialogue and negotiation. China stands ready to work with the international community to pool efforts together and uphold justice, and work for restoring peace and stability in the Middle East.”

For at least two other reasons, Beijing finds Tehran expendable: it views Tehran as both hierarchically subordinate and as having made bad decisions. The relative rankings reflect China’s pride in its long cultural history and recent economic successes. Iran’s poor choices include supporting trouble-causing proxies that drain Iran’s resources and drag the country into battles that could destroy the ruling regime. Beijing, of course, enjoys Tehran’s disruptions of the Washington-led order that protects individuals around the world. Still, China regards Iran as a battered rose that an attentive gardener would clip.

The Russia case

More critically to imminent U.S. actions, as Israel exposes Iran’s expendability to China, so does Ukraine uncover Russia’s limited utility to China.

Contrary to pronouncements about a “special relationship”, the Communist Party of China views Russia as an inferior, imprudent and reckless nation that serves some of the party’s strategic interests.

Geographically, the two countries commercially snuggle and militarily struggle over more than 2,500 miles of shared borders. But that’s where ruptures break out like acne on a teenager. Historically, China and Russia’s geographic edges expose their cultural distrust and, at times, outright enmity.

Chinese regret ceding Amur Basin territories to Russia under China’s Qing empire. And China still commemorates Russian machine gun massacres of Chinese in the Amur River.

Similarly, Russians rue surrendering wealth to China through contracts that throttle Russian returns. Since Putin’s 2022 “special military operation” against Ukraine, Russia is replacing lost oil sales revenue by selling more oil to China at lower than market prices.

Despite public proclamations, Xi Jinping and the political party he serves consider Vladimir Putin subordinate, impulsive and harmful to long term objectives. In guanxi-warfare fashion, the Chinese Communist Party used Alexander Lukashenko’s trip to Beijing in June to make that point. As Belarusian head-of-state and Putin’s close ally, Lukashenko could reasonably expect pageantry and solemnity to characterize his visit to Beijing. The CCP, however, denied Lukashenko these signs of respect. If Putin’s position had pleased the CCP, it would have heaped pomp on Lukashenko’s visit. Instead, the party displayed its disdain for Putin by downgrading the Belarusian’s journey to an homage-paying pilgrimage.

The Chinese Communist Party views the Russian president just as it sees the Iranian ayatollah – presently useful but elementally expendable. If a clever landscaper prunes Russia from China’s guanxi, the Communist Party will wail rhetorically while respecting the operator who cropped the network node.

Pragmatically, a change in Communist Party behavior will take a while. Still, awareness of China’s expectations and the U.S.’s use of network combat gives all other strategies for promoting peace across the South China Sea and in the Taiwan Strait a better chance of long-term success.

Patrick Jenevein* is the author of *Dancing with the Dragon and CEO of Pointe Bello, a China-focused strategy design and implementation firm.